The NEP “plan” that Lenin adopted early on to allow some private enterprise and growth in the farming sector and other small buisnesses? Lenin did claim that this was a step backwards socioeconomically to adopt these somewhat capitalistic ideals but would eventually allow the Soviet Union to adopt socialism later and much smoother given the success the NEP plan was having in avoiding complete economic collapse and the success it had producing crops. Lenin was accused by the bolsheviks of betraying the Marxist ideals but if I recall Marx did expalin how it was neccessary to adopt capitalism after being under a Monarchy. If so why did Lenin rush to overthrow the provisional government that took power after the Tsar was stripped of power? This appeared to resemble (to me at least) the bourgeosie revolution. It all kind of fell in place it seems, but was Lenin just too impatient or too power hungry?
My final question revolves around this, more people within the party seemed accepting to Stalin taking power because of this NEP plan. Stalin really made no secret of his intentions of extreme centralization and 5 year plans that would all but destroy any form of free market that exsisted within the soviet union. My final questions are what if Stalin had kept the NEP plan intact? How much of an impact would this have had in the shaping of the soviet union? Would they have been able to adopt true socilaism within, oh, lets say 10-15 years?
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Should Stalin Have Not Thrown Out…?
Posted on January 9, 2011.
One of the consequence of the anti-Stalin campaign initiated by the CPSU in 1953 has been that a number of facets of Stalin’s interventions on cultural questions are virtually unknown in the Communist movement. It is a telling commentary on this state of affairs that Paresh Dhar in his review of Asok Chattopadhyaya’s book Martiya Chirayat Bhabana – Silpa Sahitya Prasanga (in Bengali) can write that ‘what is most striking is that by a special research work, Asok has unveiled Stalin’s numerous involvements with art and literature of which we never heard before’, (Frontier, May 24th, 1997).
This discussion took place between Stalin, Zhdanov and Molotov from the political leadership of the CPSU(b), and S.M, Eisenstein and N. Cherkasov at the end of February, 1947. It was an integral part of the attempt by the Bolshevik party in the post-war period to raise the artistic level of Soviet culture and to eliminate weaknesses in ideological and political content.1 Prior to the discussion the Central Committee of the CPSU(b) had on September 4th, 1946 taken a decision on the film Glowing life. Parts of the decision which bear on Ivan the Terrible are cited here:
‘The fact of the matter is that many of our leading cinema workers – producers, directors and scenario writers – are taking a lighthearted and irresponsible attitude to their duties and are not working conscientiously on the films they produce. The chief defect in their work is failure to study subject matter… Producer Eisenstein betrayed ignorance of historical facts in the second series of Ivan Grozny, depicting Ivan Grozny’s progressive army, the oprichniki, as a gang of degenerates reminiscent of the American Ku Klux Klan. Ivan Grozny, a man of strong will and character, is shown as a spineless weakling, as a Hamlet type…
‘One of the fundamental reasons for the production of worthless films is the lack of knowledge of subject matter and the lighthearted attitude of scenario writers and producers to their work.
‘The Central Committee finds that the Ministry of Cinematography, and primarily its head, Comrade Bolshakov, exercises inadequate supervision over film studios, producers and scenario writers, is doing too little to improve the quality of films and is spending large sums of money to no useful purpose. Leading officials of the Ministry of Cinematography take an irresponsible attitude to the work entrusted to them and are indifferent to the ideological and political content and artistic merits of the films being produced.
‘The Central Committee is of the opinion that the work of the Ministry’s Art Council is incorrectly organized. The council does not ensure impartial and
business-like criticism of films for production. It often takes an apolitical attitude in its judgement of film and pays little attention to their idea-content. Many of its members display lack of principle in their assessment of films, their judgment being based on personal, friendly relations with the producers. The absence of criticism in the cinema and the prevalent narrow-circle atmosphere are among the chief reasons for the production of poor films.
‘Art workers must realise that those who continue to take an irresponsible, lighthearted attitude to their work, may well find themselves superfluous and outside the ranks of progressive Soviet art, for the cultural requirements and demands of the Soviet theatregoer have developed and the Party and Government will continue to cultivate among the people good taste and encourage exacting demands on works of art.’ (Decisions of the Central Committee, C.P.S.U.(b) On Literature and Art (]946-1948), Moscow, 1951, pp. 26-28.)
NEP was only meant to be a temporary measure to kickstart the economy after the disasters of WWI and the Civil War. Marxist orthodoxy claims that in order to achieve Communism the means of production must be owned by the workers.
NEP still had the banks and large enterprises under government ownership, as per War Communism, but it allowed small businesses and farmers to own their businesses. By the mid 1920s NEP was creating a prosperous class of business owners and some farmers were also prospering – and the debate on what to replace it with was gathering momentum. By 1928 the argument had been settled in favour of the Five Year Plans.
NEP was seen as a failure by the Marxist Bolsheviks because it was an economic success and the reason for the shift in policy in 1928 / 29 was because of ideological considerations.
The main disadvantage was that it was not creating an urban working class, nor was it modernising Russian industry as fast as was considered necessary – as Russia felt isolated and encircled, the threat of invasion snuffing out the revolution was never far from the minds of the leading Bolsheviks.
It was not a failure as a business model, in fact it was remarkably successful, creating some social divisions between the prosperous “NEPmen” and other workers.
See:http://www.soviethistory.org/index.php?p…http://www.spartacus.schoolnet.co.uk/RUS…
Lenin rushed to seize power from the Provisional Government because, he argued, Marx’s historic stages could be “telescoped”. He claimed that because the February Revolution was a capitalist, bourgeois revolution then that stage of history could be shortened, and Russia could move swiftly towards socialism. This was one of the central differences that led to the split between the Bolsheviks and Mensheviks. Also, and, more importantly, he realised that the PG was weak, but would not remain weak for long, he he waited then the government may have been in a position to repel the coup.
A good question, with at least four possible outcome,s if we imagine that WWII never took place and that no other country invaded:
1) Had NEP remained in place, then the USSR may have developed a humane, and successful, form of socialism, akin to Yugoslavia before the collapse or even Vietnam or Cuba. The centrifugal forces that split the country apart may have been controllable, with cooperation rather than coercion being the key to keeping the USSR together. Gorbachev had NEP in mind when he began his reform programmes.
2) The relative smallness of the industrial, urban, working class, leads to resentment in the countryside. The peasants, with the sailors at Kronshtadt leading the movement, rise up and replace the Bolsheviks. They implement a primitive, agrarian socialism, based on the village. Religion observation becomes mandatory. Grand Duke Michael is invited back to wild jubilation, as the new Tsar. His powers are limited by the re-convened State Duma.
3) Civil war and tyranny. The hard liners resent the turning away from socialism, muster their forces, including the Cheka, re-igniting the civil war. A communist Napoleon comes to the fore – Lev Trotsky . His rule is even more terrible than Stalin’s.
4) Due to a the forces of coercion not being as centralised, the various nationalities demand greater and greater autonomy from Moscow. Eventually those formerly independent republics splinter off – Ukraine, Georgia and Armenia, and some of the Russian regions begin to demand Independence – Tatarstan and Chechnya.